Section 225A of the Constitution provides that the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) shall have the power to deregister a political party under certain circumstances, including breach of registration requirements, failure to secure a prescribed percentage of votes in presidential or governorship elections, or failure to win specified elective offices.
While these provisions have been upheld by the courts, they raise important constitutional and democratic concerns. The formation of a political party is one of the most fundamental expressions of the right to freedom of association. Any legal framework that makes the registration and continued existence of political parties burdensome risks limiting political participation and reducing democratic competition.
However, beyond the policy debate lies an important legal question regarding the nature of INEC’s power under Section 225A.
The Constitution states that:
“The Independent National Electoral Commission shall have power to de-register a political party…”
Notably, it does not state that:
“The Independent National Electoral Commission shall de-register a political party…”
This distinction is significant. The former is an enabling provision that confers authority on INEC, while the latter would impose a mandatory duty. If the Constitution had used mandatory language, any interested person could potentially seek judicial intervention to compel INEC to deregister a party that met the constitutional conditions.
Instead, the wording grants INEC discretion. The existence of the conditions listed in Section 225A does not automatically require deregistration; rather, those conditions merely trigger INEC’s authority to consider whether deregistration is appropriate in the circumstances.
This means that additional considerations should be relevant. For example, where a political party is alleged to have breached registration requirements, principles of fairness would suggest that the party should be notified of the breach and given a reasonable opportunity to remedy it before any decision is taken.
Similarly, it would appear unreasonable to deregister a party that has elected representatives in a legislative body merely because it failed to secure 25 percent of votes in a presidential election. The same concerns arise where a newly registered party is given little time to establish itself before being assessed against electoral performance benchmarks.
These examples demonstrate that the mere existence of one of the constitutional conditions should not automatically justify overriding the constitutional right of citizens to associate politically through a registered party.
Although the Supreme Court has interpreted Section 225A as permitting deregistration based solely on the stated conditions, it may be argued that insufficient attention was paid to the distinction between a discretionary power and a mandatory obligation. The courts have previously recognised that the existence of a statutory power does not, by itself, justify actions that adversely affect the rights of others. The rule of law generally requires clear and transparent criteria guiding the exercise of such powers.
Another important point concerns institutional authority. Section 225A expressly vests the power of deregistration in INEC. The Constitution does not confer that power on any court. Courts may review the legality of INEC’s decisions and determine whether the Commission has acted within the law, but the constitutional text places the power to deregister political parties squarely in the hands of INEC.
Whatever one’s view of the wisdom of Section 225A, it remains arguable that the provision grants a discretionary power rather than imposes a mandatory duty, and that the exercise of that power must be justified by considerations beyond the mere existence of the conditions listed in the Constitution. Equally, the constitutional text appears clear that the power to deregister political parties belongs exclusively to INEC and not to the courts.
Published by Chuks Nwachuku
