Experience in litigating disputes within companies, professional associations, voluntary organizations, and political parties reveals a recurring pattern: courts often become unintended catalysts of factionalization within these bodies. This outcome is largely driven by two factors. The first is a misunderstanding of the fundamental principle that governs judicial intervention in internal disputes of voluntary associations. The second, more troubling factor, is the influence of corruption and personal interest in certain cases.
A major problem lies in the failure of courts to properly appreciate the principle of majority rule, which is central to the functioning and stability of voluntary associations. When courts intervene in internal disputes in a manner that effectively overrides the decision of the majority, such intervention may amount to an indirect infringement of the constitutional right to freedom of association.
Too often, individual members approach the courts alleging breaches of procedural provisions within the constitution of their association. In resolving such disputes, courts sometimes treat the constitution of a private or voluntary association as though it holds the same legal status as the Constitution of the state. This approach is, in my view, fundamentally flawed. The constitution of a voluntary association operates as an internal governance framework, subject ultimately to the collective will of its members, who may in appropriate circumstances waive or ratify procedural irregularities.
The key limitation on the autonomy of such associations arises only where actions are ultra vires—that is, beyond the legal powers of the association—or where there is a breach of provisions that protect the personal rights of individual members. Such personal rights typically include the right to receive notice of meetings, the right to attend and participate in meetings, and the right to vote and be voted for in accordance with the association’s rules.
Where the complaint relates purely to procedural irregularity in the conduct of internal affairs, such matters ordinarily fall within the competence of the association itself. They are issues for internal resolution, ratification, or waiver by the majority. In such circumstances, judicial intervention to invalidate the decision of the majority undermines the principle of self-governance and distorts the internal democratic structure of the association.
It is therefore inappropriate for individual members to assume the role of arbiters over the internal governance of associations by invoking minor procedural breaches as grounds for litigation. Excessive judicial interference in such matters contributes significantly to internal division, leadership crises, and factional conflicts, which in many cases extend beyond the association and affect public order and stability.
The proper role of the courts in such disputes should be limited. Where necessary, courts may decline jurisdiction in matters that are essentially internal and collective in nature, particularly where the grievance does not implicate personal legal rights. Conversely, an association itself may properly seek judicial protection, including injunctive relief, against actions by members that threaten its lawful functioning.
Ultimately, a restrained approach to judicial intervention better preserves the integrity of voluntary associations, respects the principle of majority rule, and gives full effect to the constitutional right to freedom of association
Published by Chuks Nwachuku
